UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

SUDAN DIARRA,

CASE NO. 3:06 CV 7073

Plaintiff.

CHIEF JUDGE JAMES G. CARR

v.

OPINION AND ORDER

ALLEN COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

On March 7, 2006, this action was transferred from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Plaintiff <u>prose</u> Sudan Diarra brings this <u>in forma pauperis</u> action against Allen County Child Support Enforcement and Ohio Job & Family Services. The complaint appears to challenge an Allen County child support order. For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Although <u>pro se</u> pleadings are liberally construed, <u>Boag v. MacDougall</u>, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); <u>Haines v. Kerner</u>, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable

basis in law or fact.¹ Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996).

A claim may be dismissed <u>sua sponte</u>, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute.

<u>McGore v. Wrigglesworth</u>, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997);

<u>Spruytte v. Walters</u>, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), <u>cert.</u>

<u>denied</u>, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); <u>Harris v. Johnson</u>, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); <u>Brooks v. Seiter</u>, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).

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Principles requiring generous construction of <u>pro se</u> pleadings are not without limits.

Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to

satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859

F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions never

squarely presented to them. Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would "require ...[the courts] to

explore exhaustively all potential claims of a <u>pro se</u> plaintiff, ... [and] would...transform the district

court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest

arguments and most successful strategies for a party." <u>Id.</u> at 1278.

Even liberally construed, the complaint does not contain allegations reasonably

suggesting plaintiff might have a valid federal claim. See, Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ.,

76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996)(court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal

conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief). Accordingly, the request

to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and this action is dismissed under section 1915(e). Further,

the court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not

be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/ JAMES G. CARR CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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